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Abstract
Turing proposed in 1950 his famous imitation game or test: a machine is supposed to im-
itate, sometimes a woman, sometimes a man. In 1995 scientists in artificial intelligence
complained that, according to Turing, the goal of the field should be to build a “mechanical
transvestite.” Supporters of Turing’s test as a decisive experiment for machine intelligence
then suggested to read “man” in Turing’s text as masculine generics. Drawing also from
primary sources other than Turing’s 1950 text, they argued that Turing must have proposed
not a gender, but a species test. My contention is that Turing did propose gender learning
and imitation as one of his various tests for machine intelligence. I shall reconstruct the
context of Turing’s 1950 proposal and point out that it came out of a 1949 controversy, no-
tably with neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. I will then try to show that Turing designed his
imitation game as a thought experiment to refute, among other things, an a priori view of
Jefferson that intelligence was an exclusive feature of the animal nervous system, and that
interesting behavior in the male and the female was largely determined by sex hormones.
Keywords: Alan Turing; Thought experiment; Turing-Jefferson controversy; Artificial
intelligence; Gender and species diversity.
1. Preliminaries
In (1950) Alan Turing (1912-1954) wrote his famous phrase: “I propose to consider the
question, ‘Can machines think?”’ He then proceeded to replace this question:
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we
call the ‘imitation game’. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman
(B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays
in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator
is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He
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knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either ‘X is A
and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A’. [...] We now ask the question, ‘What will happen
when a machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will the interrogator decide
wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game
is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original,
‘Can machines think?’ (Turing, 1950, p. 433)
This presentation of the game relates two variants, namely, a baseline man-imitates-woman
variant and a machine-imitates-woman one, where a decision about the significance of the
latter depends on results of the former. Note that the interrogator is not supposed to be
thinking about the differences between women and machines, but between women and
men. This is an interesting move of Turing to control bias against the ontological kind of
player A, for the whole point of the game is being able to distinguish the gender of the
players by their behavior alone. If the machine is able to learn and imitate gender, then
it must be considered intelligent. Turing illustrated a few questions that the interrogator
could make, for example, “Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair?” Supposing
that X is actually A (man or machine trying to pass as a woman), Turing suggested that A
could give answers like “My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches
long.” To neutralize signals such as tone of voice, Turing suggested that all communication
between the interrogator and the participants should be typewritten and teleprinted.
In spite of this glaring reference to gender imitation, most philosophers still have
difficulties in acknowledging the presence of a gender issue in the so-called Turing test.
2. The problem
Turing also referred to his iconic proposal as “my test” (1950, p. 446-7, e p. 454). And
this is how it became known in philosophy (Oppy & Dowe, 2003), with scarce reference to
gender imitation and to the historical context of Turing’s 1950 proposal.
Andrew Hodges, biographer and one of the first collectors of primary and secondary
sources on Turing’s life and work, came to write in his renowned Alan Turing: the enigma
(1983) that Turing’s “sexual guessing game” was “in fact a a red herring, and one of the few
passages of the paper that was not expressed with perfect lucidity” (p. 415). Hodges con-
tinued his struggle with Turing’s text: “[t]he whole point of this game was that a successful
imitation of a woman’s responses by a man would not prove anything.” But “[g]ender,”
Hodges argued, “depended on facts which were not reducible to sequences of symbols” (no
emphasis added). Hodges thus just begged the question, as whether or not gender could
be learned and imitated by a machine was the very issue at stake in Turing’s discussion.
Some interpreters did notice the presence of a gender issue in Turing’s test. Susan
Sterrett (2000) argued for the acknowledgement of Turing’s 1950 historical imitation game
and against the idealized Turing test that has been construed in philosophy. She asserted
that gender poses an interesting test for machine intelligence because it “is an especially
salient and pervasive example of ingrained responses, including linguistic responses.” So,
Sterrett found, “the significance of the use of gender in the Original Imitation Game Test
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is in setting a task for the man that demands that he critically reflect on his responses”
(p. 550). Sterrett recently restated her interpretation (2020). Her focus in both occasions,
however, if I understand it correctly, was the study of Turing’s 1950 test as a game and how
good his game is as an intellectual task. One of the earliest interpreters that recognized
a gender issue in Turing’s 1950 proposal was Judith Genova (1994). She found in it the
view that “gender is a matter of knowledge,” and added: “both thinking and being for
Turing are discursive, cultural phenomena, not biological ones” (p. 315). But Genova
concluded that, for Turing, emulation or good simulation “collapses the distinction between
the real and the simulated” (p. 320), as if Turing would have endorsed a dismissal of the
ontological distinction between the natural and the artificial. Turing was a natural scientist
and mathematician. In matters of taste, he expressed his dislike to equating the natural and
the artificial — e.g., in a (1951) BBC radio broadcast he took as “quite futile” to try to make
machines with characteristics such as the shape of the human body, “and their results would
have something like the unpleasant quality of artificial flowers” (p. 486). So one may ask:
would Turing have suggested to blur the real and the simulated, or that anything goes?
At the other end, interpreters such as Jack Copeland (2004, p. 435-6) and James
Moor (2001), following Gualtiero Piccinini (2000), acknowledged no gender test whatso-
ever as present in Turing’s 1950 text. Rather, they offered an argument — now hegemonic
in philosophy — that Turing would have proposed a species test (whether the machine
kind can match the human kind in intelligence). Their argument is based on a passage
of Turing’s text that appears nine pages further than his first presentation of the game. It
describes a version of the test that is different than the machine-imitates-woman one:
‘Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer [...]. Is it true that
by modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its
speed of action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, [it] can be
made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B
being taken by a man?’ (Turing, 1950, p. 442)
This is the variant of the game that we may call machine-imitates-man. However, inter-
preters that dismiss the presence of a gender issue in Turing’s test read “man” in the pas-
sage as masculine generics and interpret this version as a machine-imitates-human test,
which they suggest to be the one chosen Turing test. Now, we have just seen that Turing
took the pains to introduce the imitation game in clear reference to gender imitation and
a gender-aware masculine — the reader may recall that the machine is supposed to imi-
tate the woman just as the man is. Why would he in the same text without further notice
just drop that and undo what he was trying to do? If we erase gender imitation from his
presentation of the game, how could we keep the coherence and intelligibility of his text?
These interpreters argue that Turing was overly ambiguous and then it may be infor-
mative to broaden our interpretation to encompass other primary sources, namely (1948,
1952). Considering this larger corpus, they claim, it is easy to see that Turing’s overarching
goal is to propose a species test. This is, in my view, something reasonable to concede. I
think that it is true that over the 1948-1952 period Turing was mostly concerned with the
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proposal of a species test. But does this mean that he did not propose any gender test what-
soever in his 1950 paper? Does it give reason to sidetrack the presence of a gender issue
in the famous Turing test in philosophy? In the background, there lies a central question:
those are writers who claim the Turing test to be a decisive experiment for artificial intelligence
today. On this premise, one would need to locate in Turing’s 1950 text a best experiment
design to point out to scientists interested in execute it. More than that, it is an implicit
desideratum for an idealized Turing test that it is defensible against the severe attacks
that it received. A machine intelligence test in which the machine should imitate, now a
woman, now a man, could be ridiculed by less sensible readers, as in fact it was. Piccinini
(2000), Moor (2001) and Copeland (2004, p. 435-6) were all writing a few years after
(1995), when at then the main research conference in the field now called artificial intelli-
gence, Patrick Hayes and Kenneth Ford suggested that scientists should abandon the Turing
test, among other things, because it requires the construction of a “mechanical transvestite”
(p. 973). Their general point was that Turing’s imitation game looks bad and too imprecise
from an experiment-design point of view and that attempts to actually implement it as a
scientific experiment led only to frustration. And this has since then been increasingly en-
dorsed by others. For instance, Drew McDermott wrote in (2014) that “[c]onsidering the
importance Turing’s Imitation Game has assumed in the philosophy-of-mind literature of
the last fifty years, it is a pity he was not clearer about what the game was exactly.” We
shall now be ready to state the problem of this paper:
The problem of the role of gender in the Turing test and how it affects the value of the
test as an experiment. Did Turing propose or not gender imitation as part of his test for
machine intelligence? If so, what does it have to do with intelligence? Was it just a joke or
does it address a serious empirical problem?
I shall state from the beginning that I am not in a position to discuss the topic of
gender in itself. My task here is rather to shed light on the historical background of Turing’s
1950 discussion and on why he tried to address a gender issue in his famous imitation game
seen as a specific kind of experiment. My hope is that, once this is done, gender scholars
shall be better positioned to advance the topic by considering its state of the art in science
and the philosophy and as well as its connections with artificial intelligence. I shall now
give a succinct account of my findings and how they are distributed in the paper.
I shall contend with the interpretive basis suggested by Copeland, Moor e Piccinini,
which aims at the location and selection of a preferable experiment design for Turing’s
1950 imitation game or test. Interpreters in this class seem to take for granted that there
must be some special one version of Turing’s test to be portrayed as a decisive experiment
for machine intelligence. This is in spite of the glaring fact that Turing presented several
versions of it, apparently with no commitment at all neither to mathematical nor to exper-
imental precision in the description of any one of them. In effect, Turing presented various
versions of his imitation game before, during, and after the development of his 1950 paper.
I shall present extensive evidence for this in what follows (§§3, 4). Turing’s 1950 proposal
has been severely attacked from an experiment-design point of view, e.g., by Hayes and
Ford (1995), McDermott (2014) and Marcus et al. (2016). The imitation game, however,
to the best of my knowledge, has just never been studied as a thought experiment. Ac-
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cording to Ernst Mach (§4), the method of continuous variation of conditions — just as
Turing did in his exposition — is an excellent way to present both thought and physical
experiments, and not a weakness as has been suggested by critics of Turing’s 1950 paper.
Also, I shall challenge Hodges’ interpretation that Turing’s references to gender
imitation were a distraction and would have composed a less lucid passage of his text.
Hodges did not pay attention to the fact that Turing’s imitation game came out of a contro-
versy, notably with Geoffrey Jefferson. Professor of Neurosurgery at the same University of
Manchester where Turing was affiliated with to lead digital computing, Jefferson had posed
in June (1949) a bold critique of its analogy with the human brain. Jefferson suggested
that intelligence was an exclusive feature of the animal nervous system and that behavior
in the male and the female was largely determined by their respective sex hormones. This
connection, as far as I know, has never been noticed in the secondary literature on the
Turing test. I will briefly reconstruct the Turing-Jefferson controversy (§5), and present a
schematic view of the structure of Turing’s imitation game as a thought experiment (§6).
It shall become apparent overall, I hope, that Turing’s 1950 test is largely a reply
to Jefferson’s 1949 text; and also, that the role of gender in Turing’s 1950 imitation game
or test is an ingenious response to a serious research problem posed by Jefferson. Finally,
I shall posit that the acknowledgement of a gender issue in Turing’s proposal does not
diminish its scientific and philosophical significance but rather increases it (§7).
3. Turing’s various historical imitation tests (1948-1952)
In the summer of (1948), University of Manchester Professor of Electrical Engineering F.
C. Williams and his colleague Tom Kilburn announced that a rudimentary and small-scale
machine was in operation. Turing had just left the National Physical Laboratory in London
to work on this project at Manchester. He was supposed to design the fundamental pro-
grams for this machine, but was still unable to use its hardware for his machine intelligence
experiments. He thus created in collaboration with his friend, statistician David Champer-
nowne, the notion of a “paper machine” (1948, p. 416). This was a scheme designed for
a human being to emulate a machine in a game of chess against another human being.
Based on this scheme, Turing described the design for an initial experiment on machine
intelligence, as yet unnamed, which he said he had actually done at that point:
It is possible to do a little experiment on these lines, even at the present stage
of knowledge. It is not difficult to devise a paper machine which will play a not
very bad game of chess. Now get three men as subjects for the experiment A,
B, C. A and C are to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works
the paper machine. (In order that he should be able to work it fairly fast it
is advisable that he be both mathematician and chess player.) Two rooms are
used with some arrangement for communicating moves, and a game is played
between C and either A or the paper machine. C may find it quite difficult to
tell which he is playing. (This is a rather idealized form of an experiment I have
actually done.) (Turing, 1948, p. 431)
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The first and the last phrases are significant. The passage shows that Turing was conscious
about setting “idealized” conditions for an experiment. Key elements of the structure of the
(yet unnamed) imitation game were present at that point: three players assume different
roles in the game, and there is a criterion to measure how successful the machine was.
These elements would be preserved in Turing’s 1950 imitation tests.
In the 1950 versions of his imitation game or test — some of which we have just seen
(§2) —, Turing changed the intellectual task to be addressed by the machine, as known, to
conversational question-answering. And he kept varying the design of his test for machine
intelligence. At the end of his 1950 paper, he was not sure about which intellectual field
was best for exploration and testing. He wrote:
We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely
intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a dif-
ficult decision. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing
of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the
machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to
understand and speak English. [...] Again I do not know what the right answer
is, but I think both approaches should be tried. (Turing, 1950, p. 460)
So for Turing, his imitation game could be played either in abstract activities such as chess-
playing (as he described in 1948) or in more sensible ones such as conversational question-
answering (as he proposed in 1950).
Two years later in his participation in the January (1952) BBC roundtable on ma-
chine intelligence, Turing gave yet another description of “[his] test” (p. 495). As in 1950,
the test was based on a unrestricted viva-voce examination. But in 1952 Turing invoked
the scenario of a law court and a jury that would interrogate the machine:
You might call it a test to see whether the machine thinks, but it would be better
to avoid begging the question, and say that the machines that pass are (let’s
say) ‘Grade A’ machines. The idea of the test is that the machine has to try and
pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if
the pretence is reasonably convincing. A considerable proportion of a jury, who
should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by the pretence. They
aren’t allowed to see the machine itself — that would make it too easy. So the
machine is kept in a far away room and the jury are allowed to ask it questions,
which are transmitted through to it: it sends back a typewritten answer.
[...] Well, that’s my test. Of course I am not saying at present either that
machines really could pass the test, or that they couldn’t. My suggestion is just
that this is the question we should discuss. It’s not the same as ‘Do machines
think,’ but it seems near enough for our present purpose, and raises much the
same difficulties. (Turing et al., 1952, p. 495)
Turing explicitly stated that an answer to his slippery experimental question does not have
to be decisive with respect to the original question on whether machines can think.
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Now, I conclude this examination of Turing’s multiple versions of his imitation game
or test by bringing forth a key passage. To my knowledge it has never been noticed in the
secondary literature. Eventually in the January 1952 BBC roundtable, Turing said:
This means that if the machine was being put through one of my imitation tests,
it would have to do quite a bit of acting, but if one was comparing it with a man
in a less strict sort of way the resemblance might be quite impressive.
(Turing et al., 1952, p. 503, emphasis added)
So Turing himself explicitly acknowledged that he had been (from 1948 to 1952) present-
ing and discussing various “imitation tests.” Altogether, I submit, the view that Turing had
proposed one single special or preferable test for machine intelligence is just far fetched.
4. Turing’s method of varying the experiment design of his 1950 imitation game
Based on his imitation game, Turing asked these four experimental questions Q′ . . . Q′′′′ in
replacement of the original question Q (“can machines think?”):
(Q′). “‘What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will the
interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does
when the game is played between a man and a woman?” (p. 434). Note that this is
a machine-imitates-woman version of the game.
(Q′′). “There are [...] digital computers in working order, and it may be asked, ‘Why not
try the experiment straight away? [...]’ The short answer is that we are not asking
whether all digital computers would do well in the game nor whether the comput-
ers at present available would do well, but whether there are imaginable computers
which would do well” (p. 436).
(Q′′′). “‘Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer [...]. Is it true that by
modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed
of action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, [it] can be made to play
satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by a
man?”’ (p. 442). This is a machine-imitates-man version of the game. Recall that
some interpreters read “man” here as masculine generics and construe a machine-
imitates-human version of it, which they like the most and call “the Turing test.”
(Q′′′′). Whether or not “in about fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme computers
with a storage capacity of about 109 to make them play the imitation game so well
that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent. chance of making
the right identification after five minutes of questioning” (p. 442).
Turing stated belief that the answer to the fourth variant (Q′′′′) of the question would be
yes. Note that in the first version (Q′) Turing proposed a decision rule about whether or
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not a machine passes the machine-imitates-woman test. It shall depend on the results of
the man-imitates-woman one. To keep his text intelligible, we shall understand that this
decision rule was implicitly kept in the second and third versions (Q′′, Q′′′). This does not
seem to hold for the fourth one. In this case, nonetheless, it seems that he was offering a
rough prediction about the game were it to be played in this century.
The fact that Turing made the design of his test to slip through his 1950 text led
scientists in artificial intelligence such as Hayes and Ford (1995) and McDermott (2014) to
question its soundness as a reference experiment for machine intelligence. But this reading
raises yet another question: why would Turing, an extraordinary scientist and mathemati-
cian, propose an experiment whose design was bad or too imprecise? The answer is simple,
and yet it has never been actually studied in the secondary literature: the so-called Turing
test is a thought experiment. As such, its design is not fixed, nor should it be.
In the history of science, the method of continuous variation of experimental condi-
tions is not to be confused with loose rhetorics. According to Ernst Mach, who was one of
the scholars to have firstly used the term Gedankenexperiment, later translated to “thought
experiment” (1897), this is essential to both thought and physical experiments:
[T]he basic method of thought experiments, as with physical experiments, is
that of variation. By varying the conditions (continuously if possible), the scope
of ideas (expectations) tied to them is extended: by modifying and specializing
the conditions we modify and specialize the ideas, making them more determi-
nate, and the two processes alternate. (Mach, 1897, p. 139)
Mach considered paradigmatic examples. Let us then gain more depth into his point:
Conditions that have been recognized as of no account with regard to a cer-
tain result can be varied at will in thought without altering that result. By
astute handling of this procedure we may reach cases that at first blush seem
rather different, that is to generalisation of the point of view. Stevin and Galileo
showed great mastery of this device in their treatment of the inclined plane.
Poinsot, too, used this method in mechanics. To a force system A he adds two
others, B and C, C being chosen to balance each of A and B. Since the observer’s
point of view is irrelevant we are led to recognize A and B as equivalent, al-
though they might differ greatly in other ways. Huygens’ discoveries about
impact rest on thought experiments: starting from the knowledge that the mo-
tion of other bodies is as irrelevant to the colliding body as it is to the observer,
he changes the observer’s point of view and the relative motion of the surround-
ings: in this way he starts from the simplest special case and reaches important
generalizations. (Mach, 1897, p. 138)
Turing’s approach, early since 1948 up to 1952 and with some emphasis in 1950 as we
have seen, follows precisely the method described by Mach. In 1950 in particular, Turing
came up with a first experimental scenario (the man-imitates-woman game) to which he
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invited us to think about. He then kept varying this scenario and asking questions that
ranged from Q′ up to Q′′′′.
Now, if Turing continuously varied his imitation-game experiment, what phenomena
did he mean to represent? In order to answer this question, I invite the reader for a brief
detour through Turing’s polemic with Geoffrey Jefferson in the second half of 1949.
5. The Turing-Jefferson controversy
June 1949 has seen a polemic to get established in England. On the one side, Turing had
been one of the leading scientists in the national project to build the British digital com-
puter at the National Physical Laboratory after the Second World War, and was then a
Reader at the University of Manchester’s Department of Mathematics. In early November
1946, e.g., he had been interviewed by the Daily Telegraph as an authority on the new ma-
chines. On the other side, Geoffrey Jefferson (1886–1961), then Professor of Neurosurgery
at the same university, was about to dedicate his prestigious Lister Oration to the topic of
the present and future capacities of digital computers. Turing and Jefferson have then been
the protagonists of a controversy on whether or not machines could be said to think, which
was echoed in the British press.
In his Lister Oration delivered on 9 June 1949 in London, Jefferson (1886–1961) is-
sued criteria and demands to “agree that machine equals brain” (1949, p. 1110). Jefferson
had entitled his talk “The mind of mechanical man” in response to Norbert Wiener’s (1948)
Cybernetics and to the several digital-computer projects in the UK and the US, notably the
one Turing was engaged in hosted at his University of Manchester. A reporter from The Lon-
don Times covered Jefferson’s talk and emphasized one of his strong observations, which
was thus quoted the next day (10 June 1949) “No mind for mechanical man” (1949b):
[N]ot until a machine can write a sonnet or a concerto because of thoughts and
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that ma-
chine equals brain — that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No
mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance)
pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be
made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or miserable when
it cannot get what it wants. (Jefferson, 1949, p. 1110)
These words of Jefferson’s would be quoted in full by Turing in his famous (1950) text at
the time of writing roughly six months later. The reporter from The Times looked for Turing’s
lab at the University of Manchester to get a reply to Jefferson’s claims. Once asked, Turing
replied sharply in wit and with his usual touch of humor. On the next day (11 June 1949),
Turing was thus cited in the London newspaper under headline “Calculus to Sonnet”:
Mr. Turing said yesterday: “This is only a foretaste of what is to come, and
only the shadow of what is going to be. We have to have some experience
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with the machine before we really know its capabilities. It may take years
before we settle down to the new possibilities, but I do not see why it should
not enter any one of the fields normally covered by the human intellect, and
eventually compete on equal terms”. “I do not think you can even draw the line
about sonnets, though the comparison is perhaps a little bit unfair because a
sonnet written by a machine will be better appreciated by another machine”.
Mr. Turing added that the University was really interested in the investigation
of the possibilities of machines for their own sake. Their research would be
directed to finding the degree of intellectual activity of which a machine was
capable, and to what extent it could think for itself. News of the experiments
was disclosed by Professor Jefferson in the Lister Oration reported in The Times
yesterday. (Times, 1949a)
From this day on the Turing-Jefferson controversy was established. Two weeks later, when
the text read by Jefferson in his Lister Oration was published by the British Medical Journal,
Turing did not escape a warning note from the editorial that opened the edition:
Mr. A. W. Turing [sic], who is one of the mathematicians in charge of the
Manchester “mechanical brain,” said in an interview with The Times (June 11)
that he did not exclude the possibility that a machine might produce a sonnet,
though it might require another machine to appreciate it. Probably he did not
mean this to be taken too seriously [...]. (BMJ, 1949)
And it turns out that a sonnet-writing machine is just what Turing presented in the paper
that would be published by Mind in (1950). He quoted Jefferson’s demands that appeared
in The Times and varied a bit the design of the game — he suppressed the presence of
player B — to address Jefferson’s sonnet-writing challenge directly:
I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme [...] point
of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a
test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under
the name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands some-
thing or has ‘learnt it parrot fashion’. Let us listen in to a part of such a viva voce:
Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads ‘Shall I compare thee
to a summer’s day’, would not ‘a spring day’ do as well or better?
Witness: It wouldn’t scan.
Interrogator: How about ‘a winter’s day’. That would scan all right.
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter’s day.
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas?
Witness: In a way.
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter’s day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick
would mind the comparison.
Witness: I don’t think you’re serious. By a winter’s flay one means a typical
winter’s day, rather than a special one like Christmas. (Turing, 1950, p. 446)
10
This was a high moment of Turing’s 1950 paper and his illustration of the imitation game.
Jefferson’s Lister Oration (1949), in fact, had posed a bold critique of the analogy
between the new electronic computing machines and the human brain. He spoke out
against the idea that machines could think and even tied it to “political” and “religious”
issues. He urged that “the concept of thinking like machines lends itself to certain political
dogmas inimical to man’s happiness [and] erodes religious beliefs that have been mainstays
of social conduct” (p. 1107). The influence of Jefferson’s text on Turing’s 1950 paper is
material and enormous. We know that they met once in a late October 1949 seminar at
the University of Manchester’s Department of Philosophy (Swinton, 2019), and again in
late December 1949 when another edition of the seminar took place and Jefferson had
Turing and neurophysiologist J. Z. Young for dinner (Irvine, 1959, p. xx). Turing had an
annotated physical copy of Jefferson’s (1949) text, which can be found in the King’s College
Archive at Cambridge University. Abramson observed (2011) in Turing’s copy of Jefferson’s
Lister Oration that Turing marked in pen two passages: Jefferson’s demands that appeared
in The Times (p. 1110, which Turing also quoted in full in his 1950 text, cf. p. 445-6);
and Jefferson’s exposition (p. 1106) of René Descartes’s Discourse on method, Part V. These
passages, together with another central one that we are about to see, I found, have been
influential elements in the setup of Turing’s 1950 imitation game.
6. The 1950 imitation game as a thought experiment
One of Mach’s points about thought experiments is that they are sourced in quasi-sensory
information such as memories and combinations of memories of sense elements (1897,
p. 137). We shall see next source materials that Turing drained from culture and from his
polemic with Jefferson into the structure of the imitation game.
6.1. Source materials
Twenty Questions was a radio parlor game originated in the United States in the nineteenth
century whose popularity escalated in the late 1940s, when then a British version started
to be run and broadcasted by BBC. (Specifically, the BBC aired a version on radio from 28
February 1947 to 1976 with TV specials airing in 1947 and 1948.) On radio, the subject to
be guessed was revealed to the audience by a “mystery voice.” The players were allowed
to ask up to twenty questions about a mystery object in their quest to identify it. The only
clue supplied was whether the item was of animal, vegetable or mineral nature. (Note the
ontological nature of the clue and its focus on species.) The program had been a staple
on radio in the US and the UK since 1946.1 In terms of the logical structure of Twenty
Questions as a game, careful selection of questions could greatly improve the odds for the
questioner to win the game. Concerning the cultural background, gender-aware questions
such as “Can I give it to my wife?” were popular moments in the show.
1Cf. IMDb entry http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0320997/, and BBC’s listing for its
Home Service, for instance, at 20:30 on 22 June 1950: http://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk/page/
7c84364ebe86449da5c8ce903245fb78. All accessed on 10 Jan. 2021.
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Turing mentioned Twenty Questions once in passing (1950, p. 457). Wolfe Mays,
who met Turing in an October 1949 seminar on mind and machine at University of Manch-
ester (Swinton, 2019), guessed that Turing drew inspiration from the radio game aired by
BBC in the setup of the imitation game (1952, p. 148). Jefferson’s (1949) Lister Oration is
the other key source material for Turing’s thought experiment, specially for two very sensi-
ble images that Jefferson described. The first is based on a famous passage from Descartes’s
Discourse, and the second on the iconic tortoise of cybernetician Grey Walter.
Jefferson referred to Descartes’s Discourse in seek of support for his views. He thus
related Descartes’s approach to distinguish “man” from other animals and from “machine:”
Descartes made the point, and a basic one it is, that a parrot repeated only what
it had been taught and only a fragment of that; it never uses words to express
its own thoughts. If, he goes on to say, on the one hand one had a machine that
had the shape and appearance of a monkey or other animal without a reasoning
soul (i.e., without a human mind) there would be no means of knowing which
was the counterfeit. On the other hand, if there was a machine that appeared
to be a man, and imitated his actions so far as it would be possible to do so, we
should always have two very certain means of recognizing the deceit.
(Jefferson, 1949, p. 1106, emphasis added).
Jefferson continued with the description of the well-known “two very certain means” pro-
posed by Descartes, which Keith Gunderson called in (1964, p. 198) the language test and
the action test. Essentially, the first is comprised by verbal behavior and the second by
situated behavior — Descartes’s reference of machines were the hydraulic automata of the
Renaissance gardens, which reacted to someone’s presence and touchings of their organs.
In both forms, Descartes’s key question was whether or not there could be “sufficient di-
versity” in a machine for it to be able to imitate a man (verbally or otherwise). He could
not envisage back in the seventeenth century the possibility of a digital computer, which
Turing mathematically showed in (1936) and taught in (1950) to be a universal machine.
So Descartes offered to Turing via Jefferson the image of a machine that would resemble
a man and try to “imitate his actions.” Turing marked it with pen. This could hardly have
passed unnoticed to him indeed. In his February (1947) lecture to the London Mathe-
matical Society, Turing had literally referred to the capacity of his “universal machine” to
“imitate” any other machine. But the image offered by Descartes was sensible.
Turing will end up borrowing Descartes’s language test, not the action one. And
even this, it is worth to point out, satisfies Jefferson’s specific criteria. Up to October 1949
Turing still had the game of chess as choice of intellectual task for his imitation game. But
Jefferson returned to Descartes towards the end of his 1949 text to suggest speech as the
most distinctive intellectual faculty of “man” as opposed to “the highest animal:”
Granted that much that goes on in our heads is wordless (for if it is not, then we
must concede words, an internal vocabulary, to animals), we certainly require
words for conceptual thinking as well as for expression. It is here that there is
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the sudden and mysterious leap from the highest animal to man, and it is in
the speech areas of the dominant hemisphere [of the brain] rather than in the
pineal that Descartes should have put the soul, the highest intellectual faculties.
(Jefferson, 1949, p. 1109)
The reader may recall Jefferson’s appeal to sonnet-writing as the utmost task for an intel-
ligence test. That is all tied up to this passage about speech as a superior faculty of man,
which is in fact cartesian — as known, after his 1637 Discourse Descartes wrote to More in
(1649) that “speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body” (p. 366). Turing’s
1950 choice for speech and language over chess-playing meets Jefferson’s 1949 demand.
Now, Jefferson gave a second image to Turing, and this one was no less striking.
Jefferson referred to “sex hormones” as a distinctive feature of the behavior of “animals”
and “men,” as opposed to “modern automata” (p. 1107). It was in this connection that he
referred to the then famous electromechanical tortoise of Grey Walter:
[...It] should be possible to construct a simple animal such as a tortoise (as
Grey Walter ingeniously proposed) that would show by its movements that it
disliked bright lights, cold, and damp, and be apparently frightened by loud
noises, moving towards or away from such stimuli as its receptors were capable
of responding to. In a favourable situation the behaviour of such a toy could
appear to be very lifelike — so much so that a good demonstrator might cause
the credulous to exclaim “This is indeed a tortoise.” I imagine, however, that
another tortoise would quickly find it a puzzling companion and a disappointing
mate. (Jefferson, 1949, p. 1107)
Jefferson remarked that “neither animals nor men can be explained by studying nervous
mechanics in isolation, so complicated are they by endocrines, so coloured is thought by
emotion.” He then completed: “[s]ex hormones introduce peculiarities of behaviour often
as inexplicable as they are impressive” (p. 1107). In short, Jefferson suggested that ma-
chines could not exhibit enough peculiarities of behavior to be able to imitate the actions
of animals or “men” because they have no sex hormones. A machine would give itself
away and be found to be “a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate.” So, one may
say, Jefferson committed to an a priori assumption that the physiology of sex hormones is
causally related with gendered behavior.
In Jefferson’s passage quoted by The Times (see above), it is notable his demand that
in order to be able to think machines should demonstrate emotional reactions in general,
and be capable of being “charmed by sex” in particular. In his (1950) text, Turing chal-
lenged this in his discussion of objection (5) “Arguments from various disabilities” (p. 447).
Among other non-obvious things, he considered “fall in love” and “make someone fall in
love with it” as capabilities that do are within the reach of machines. Jefferson’s tortoise
challenge, however, Turing did not respond explicitly. One may note though that for a ma-
chine not to be a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate in the sense of Jefferson,
it must be able to learn and imitate gender.
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6.2. The inner structure
Now, one way of differentiating thought experiments from real or actual experiments is
to understand that they may accomplish their epistemic goal — solving one or more con-
troversial conceptual problems — by means of their design, not their execution. (This is
suggested, for instance, by Roy Sorensen, 1992, p. 6.) I found that Turing addressed sev-
eral important problems in the design of his imitation game, one of which is Jefferson’s
challenge about gender being determined by sex hormones.
Let us consider this schematic view of the inner structure of the imitation game. By
paying attention to its historical sources, we may consider these three schemes stepwise:
(S1) There is a human interrogator (player C) that questions a contestant entity (player A),
which gives answers so that a conversation may unfold. Player C can see, touch and
hear the inquired entity. Player A may rely on trickery to deceive C about its true onto-
logical kind (“man,” “animal” or “automaton”), while C may rely on the unrestricted
scope of the questions that can be made in order to distinguish A correctly. The in-
distinguishability from a human being in performing an intellectual task is taken as
epistemological criterion for thinking. Now, this specific scheme (S1) comes from
Descartes’s 1637 Discourse and has been reproduced by Jefferson in 1949. Because
of its choice for conversational question-answering as the preferred intellectual task
to be performed by the contestant entity A in its pretense of showcasing intelligence
or thinking, it can be called a language test.
(S2) An arrangement can be introduced in the language test to make the communication
blind between the human interrogator (C) and the contestant entity (A). The ideal
arrangement is to use different rooms for each player and convey the conversational
question-answering by teletyping. This scheme (S2) was novel and has been pro-
posed by Turing in 1950, seemingly by inspiration from Twenty Questions (the radio
parlor game aired by BBC in Turing’s time, where one has to guess the ontological
kind of an unknown entity without being able to hear its voice, to see or to touch it
but only by making questions). Turing’s goal was to draw a fairly sharp line between
the physical and the intellectual capacities of the inquired entity, and then avoid bi-
ases in the evaluation of its intelligence. This is a blind language test.
(S3) A gendered third player (B) can be introduced in the blind language test to help the
human interrogator (player C) to make the correct judgement. The best strategy for
player B is to give truthful answers. The presence of this additional player B side
by side player A (whose pretense is to try to pass to be an ontological kind different
than its own) is to serve as a baseline model of the gender performance (of either a
woman or a man, depending on the version of the game that is chosen to be played)
in a unrestricted conversation. If player A can imitate well the chosen gender, then
it will showcase not only human intelligence in general but also the “peculiarities of
behaviour” that according to Jefferson would be rendered by specific “sex hormones.”
Also, the presence of player B sharply shifts the burden of proof towards a balance, as
both contestants, the pretender (A) and the legit (B), have to perform for persuasion.
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This scheme (S3) was also part of the novelties brought by Turing in 1950, I interpret,
as a response to Jefferson’s 1949 demands. This is Turing’s 1950 imitation game, a
blind language test that comprises a gender test in particular and a species test in
general, for the imitation of a woman or a man entails the imitation of a human.
Turing argued for schemes S1 and S2 explicitly. He suggested that a language test (S1) of-
fers a convenient way to emulate a very broad scope of situated actions. He illustrated it by
presenting a few questions and answers that ranged from sonnet-writing to arithmetic and
chess-playing as intellectual topics, and wrote: “the question and answer method seems
to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavour” (p. 435).
About his modification on Descartes’s 1637 scheme S1 to make it a blind language test
(S2), he wrote:
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the
physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer or chemist claims
to be able to produce a material which is indistinguishable from the human
skin. It is possible that at some time this might be done, but even supposing
this invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to make
a ‘thinking machine’ more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh. The
form in which we have set the problem reflects this fact in the condition which
prevents the interrogator from seeing or touching the other competitors, or hearing
their voices. (Turing, 1950, p. 434, emphasis added)
The reader may compare the phrase I have emphasized in Turing’s text with Jefferson’s
1949 account of Descartes:
He [Descartes] could even conceive a machine that might speak and, if touched
in one spot, might ask what one wanted — if touched in another that it would
cry out that it hurt, and similar things. But he could not conceive of an automa-
ton of sufficient diversity to respond to the sense of all that could be said in its
presence. It would fail because it had no mind. (Jefferson, 1949, p. 1106).
Now, while Turing bored to justify his scheme S2 explicitly, he did not make a single com-
ment about scheme S3. It was effective in England back then the Criminal Law Amendment
Act of 1885. Being an homossexual was a crime, and it was just the Section 11 of this law
that would be evoked in February 1952 to charge Turing who would be convicted of “gross
indecency.” Talk of sex and gender was obviously a bad idea in England. So how could Tur-
ing address Jefferson’s claim that gender behavior is produced by sex hormones explicitly?
And yet he tackled it brilliantly, I interpret, through the design of his thought experiment.
Let us see it now in a bit more detail.
In Descartes’s language test, there are only two participants: the one contestant en-
tity — say, an animal or machine — and the human interrogator who inquiries it. Turing,
having introduced an arrangement for blind communication, introduced another arrange-
ment for a third player B supposed “to help the interrogator” in making the right decision.
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Now, let us recall Jefferson’s argument about the influence of sex hormones in the produc-
tion of peculiarities of behavior in “animals” and “men.” It turns out that Jefferson offered
the image of an electromechanical tortoise that is put side by side with an actual tortoise.
Suppose by analogy that we consider, say, as Jefferson suggested in the title of his Lister
Oration, a “mechanical man” side by side with an actual woman or man. Turing’s question
is thus posed: without being able to see, touch or hear the two, would one be able to
tell them correctly? Or would it, as predicted by Jefferson in his critique of Walter’s elec-
tromechanical tortoise, be quickly found to be “a puzzling companion and a disappointing
mate”? If the thesis that sex hormones are crucial to produce interesting behavior was
also at stake, then Descartes’s language test by itself, even if fixed by Turing’s arrangement
for blind communication, would fall short at satisfying one of Jefferson’s conditions for
machine intelligence. It would have to be extended along the lines of Turing’s scheme S3
indeed. In fact, by introducing gender imitation into the design of the imitation game,
Turing rendered a brilliant scheme to challenge Jefferson’s a priori assumption about the
relation between the physiology of sex hormones and behavior in the male and the female.
7. The scientific and philosophical significance of Turing’s 1950 imitation game
With no knowledge of the historical context from where Turing’s 1950 text came from,
some critics were unable to find scientific and/or philosophical substance in it. Some sci-
entists seem to have expected to find the description of a physical experiment ready to be
implemented, and then mistook Turing’s subtle use of irony and sense of humor as just a
joke or vacuous rhetorics. The charges of underspecification and bad experiment design
are also unjustified when it is observed over Turing sources (1948-1952) that there is no
such thing as one particular version of Turing’s imitation game or test that is preferable over
the others. Rather, Turing’s several imitation tests presented a new and general empirical
basis for discussing the original question Q (“can machines think?”) under various limit-
ing conditions. And this does not mean that Turing’s proposal did not contain a designed
experiment to test for machine intelligence. The point is rather that his experiment was
(deliberately) flexible by design and tailored to address scientific problems conceptually.
Turing articulated gender imitation neatly in an implicit reply to criteria and de-
mands posed by Jefferson within their mind-machine controversy. Turing’s attitude may
remind us of an integrity principle suggested by Popper (1959) regarding the use of thought
experiments — “not to introduce any idealizations or other special assumptions unless they
are concessions to the opponent, or at least acceptable to the opponent” (p. 466).
Popper also talked about critical and heuristic uses of imaginary experiments (Ibid.,
p. 465). While the former criticizes or tries to refute an assumption, the latter “illustrates”
and/or “suggests” a property of a studied phenomenon. This is a distinction that Jim Brown
roughly followed (1991, p. 34) under different names (“destructive” and “constructive”)
in order to dissociate himself with Popper’s falsificationism. Among several examples of
thought experiment presented by Brown, he singled out Galileo’s famous falling bodies
thought experiment as one that was both critical and heuristic (p. 43). I submit that the
same holds for Turing’s 1950 imitation game — it has both critical and heuristic functions.
16
The core critical function of the imitation game, as we have seen and as I interpret,
was twofold. First, it defied Descartes’s 1637 presumption (brought to Turing’s attention
via Jefferson) that no machine could have “sufficient diversity to respond to the sense of all
that could be said in its presence” (1949, p. 1106). Second, it challenged Jefferson’s 1949
claim that intelligence was an exclusive feature of the animal nervous system, and that
interesting behavior in the male and the female was mostly determined by sex hormones.
It is absolutely astounding to observe that Turing designed his imitation game probably in
January 1950 to challenge Jefferson’s thesis, and two years later he would be imposed by
the British State a pseudo-therapy based on sex hormones to convert his homossexual be-
havior. In fact, Turing was not converted to heterosexuality after this deplorable treatment
(Hodges, 1983, §8). Rather, one may say, he was himself proof that Jefferson was wrong.
The heuristic function of the imitation game is also a much neglected point that
Turing had been making early since February (1947), when he said: “[w]hat we want is
a machine that can learn from experience” (p. 393). In fact, Turing dedicated the last
section (§7) of his 1950 paper to outline a tentative research agenda for the development
of “learning machines” so that they could play the imitation game well. Turing’s 1950
test has been criticized to be prone for a parrot-like mimic of some behaviors. However,
submitting a machine that is not built by learning from experience and just repeats a few
trained patterns (say, a mechanical parrot) to play the imitation game is so out of sight of
the ethics of science that Turing barely spent time in discussing it:
It would be quite easy to arrange the experiences in such a way that they au-
tomatically caused the structure of the machine to build up into a previously
intended form, and this would obviously be a gross form of cheating, almost on
a par with having a man inside the machine. (Turing, 1951, p. 473)
A full development of Turing’s view of learning machines is beyond my task here. It shall
suffice though to connect it with the problem of this paper. Interpreters such as Piccinini
(2000), Moor (2001) and Copeland (2004, p. 435-6), as mentioned, seem to understand
that there must be one and only one Turing test. Since the overarching goal of Turing over
sources (1948; 1950; 1952) is clearly to propose a species test (machine-imitates-human),
then the gender test (machine-imitates-woman/man), they seem to have suggested, could
be forgotten. Hayes and Ford (1995) in turn questioned that “[t]he gender test is not
a test of making an artificial human, but of making a mechanical transvestite” (p. 973).
Now, what all these writers seem to miss is that the gender test and the species test are
not inconsistent with each other. Even if one insists in reading masculine generics in the
machine-imitates-man version, the machine-imitates woman version will warrant the pres-
ence of a gender test in Turing’s 1950 proposal. In any case, Turing’s central goal — viz.,
making machines that can learn from experience — ties together it all, for such machines
would be able to learn gender as well as sonnet-writing, arithmetics, chess-playing and
any other skill, including “quite a bit of acting” (Turing et al., 1952). Gender learning and
imitation was but one interesting skill that Turing had in mind for machines in this century.
Turing’s progressive message about both kinds of chauvinism — of gender and
species —, in short, was that the scientific and philosophical justification for them would
be in time empirically refuted, if by nothing else, by learning machines.
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